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ABSTRACT 
Considering the significant consequences of nuclear proliferation, this thesis 
asserts that historical case studies yield lessons learned that inform the suitability of 
Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) role within counterproliferation efforts that can help 
guide development of SOF counterproliferation-related missions. The important aspects 
of each case form the basis of the evaluation: the agility of SOF in relation to the success 
of the mission being examined. In other words, if the conditions enabling an 
organization’s agility are present, an organization is more likely to be successful in its 
counterproliferation role. To determine cogent lessons from SOF’s history informing 
the suitability of its role in counterproliferation, the thesis begins with a survey of SOF 
characteristics. Next, a historical analysis of two representative case studies was 
evaluated to judge the success of the operations and adherence to SOF principles and 
concepts. Both cases highlight that understanding the threat and attacking proliferation 
networks can be enhanced with coordination across SOF organizations internally and 
through partnerships fostered by engagement of United States SOF abroad. Qualities of 
increased familiarity with counterproliferation, consistent communication with weapons 
specialists, and coordination through security cooperation are present in the studies and 
can be applied to contemporary pathway defeat efforts. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) new 
authority to coordinate Department of Defense (DoD) countering weapons of mass 
destruction (CWMD) efforts, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are potentially positioned 
to assume a more impactful role within that mission.1 Special Operations Forces can use 
the transition of this authority from United States Strategic Command to USSOCOM as an 
opportunity to evaluate its role. To fully capitalize on this opportunity—and to avoid 
mistaking reorganization for progress—it is important to answer the following questions: 
What lessons can be learned from SOF’s history to inform the suitability of this role, and 
how can SOF leverage these lessons to enhance performance? Understanding the 
capabilities and opportunities involved in SOF’s role in CWMD is imperative to avoid the 
mistake of confusing reorganization for progress. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Few scenarios in the contemporary imagination conjure the catastrophic images of 
a nuclear detonation. Control of nuclear weapons and the technology to develop them 
remains an important security issue. Since 1945, over 125,000 nuclear warheads have been 
produced.2 In total, the current number of weapons is decreasing because Russia and the 
United States are reducing their stockpiles.3 However, nuclear weapons remain “integral 
to [the] conception of national security” in the minds of those that possess—or hope to 
possess—these weapons.4 Current scholarship includes examination (to varying degrees) 
of the problem of counterproliferation and SOF’s potential role in countering weapons of 
                                                 
1 Daniel M. Gerstein, “SOCOM Will Soon Lead the Pentagon’s Anti-WMD Efforts. Here’s What It 
Still Needs,” Defense One, February 10, 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/02/socom-will-
soon-lead-pentagons-anti-wmd-efforts-heres-what-it-still-needs/135331/. 
2 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (September 2013): 77, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340213501363. 
3 Kristensen and Norris, 77. 
4 Kristensen and Norris, 77. 
2 
mass destruction. First, literature examines the perceptions of counterproliferation across 
different agencies, its importance, and endorsement of interdiction and application of 
counterproliferation. Second, some literature suggests that USSOCOM is uniquely suited 
to synchronize counterproliferation efforts. Third, current scholarship intertwines with 
military doctrine to broadly associate SOF’s role in implementation of CWMD initiatives. 
1. Counterproliferation and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Existing arguments address counterproliferation of WMD and perceive 
“counterproliferation” differently. Indeed, diverging definitions and understandings of 
“counterproliferation” within government can complicate intergovernmental cooperation 
and international relations. As Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss explain, “Almost as soon 
as the concept entered the strategic lexicon… questions arose as to what it really meant.”5  
a. Interpretations 
There is a degree of variation in how many scholars have interpreted 
counterproliferation. Some view “counterproliferation” as interchangeable with 
“nonproliferation,” others suggest counterproliferation connotes a more aggressive stance.6 
The definitions, influenced by perception, outlook, and policy, continue to be a topic for 
debate and examination. Muller and Reiss capture the evolving characterization of 
counterproliferation across two presidential administrations, beginning with the Bush 
administration in 1989: 
[Counterproliferation is] [t]o fight proliferation in all its aspects, by means 
ranging from the control of dual-use technology to the preventive 
destruction of WMD facilities […] Counterproliferation as offensive 
military actions to eliminate the WMD capabilities, including the 
production facilities, of proliferators […] Counterproliferation is 
nonproliferation as performed by the Department of Defense […] 
                                                 
5 Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, “Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles,” The 
Washington Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1995): 143-54. 
6 Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss; Carlson, Lonnie. “Countering WMD Journal.” Countering WMD 
Journal, no. 15 (Summer/Fall 2017): 41–52; Margaret Kosal. “CWMD Strategy Gap: Capacities, 
Capabilities, and Collaboration.” Prism 7, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 51–67. 
3 
Counterproliferation involves preparing U.S. forces to fight and survive in 
a WMD environment.7 
As of October 2014, the Department of Defense defines counterproliferation as, 
“Those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to 
the United States, allies, and partners.”8 This definition suggests a less reactive DoD stance 
than Muller and Reiss’s most recent definition (conveyed in 1995), spurred by concern 
surrounding existing weapons, “transnational threat organizations,” and technological 
advances by “rogue regimes.”9  
The Department of Defense’s position reflects more recent arguments that discuss 
countering weapons of mass destruction, which “includes activities that span the range of 
‘prevent,’ ‘shape,’ ‘contain,’ and ‘respond’ concepts.”10 Likewise, much of the literature 
focusing on CWMD supports the application of counterproliferation efforts across a range 
of activities and adversaries’ statuses.  Margaret Kosal argues that foremost, “Denying the 
acquisition and use of WMD by hostile states, sub-state actors, or non-state actors as part 
of nonproliferation and counterproliferation… are desired strategic ends.”11 It is naturally 
more advantageous to interrupt the development of a weapon than to attempt to compel a 
WMD-armed state or manage the consequences of WMD use by an adversary. The 
prospect of eliminating such a capability would “inevitably span all phases of conflict from 
prewar engagement through combat operations to postwar reconstruction,” representing 
significant investment and risk.12 Current scholarship appears to agree that CWMD 
                                                 
7 Muller and Reiss, 144-145. 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), 54. 
9 United States. Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 25. 
10 Margaret Kosal, “CWMD Strategy Gap: Capacities, Capabilities, and Collaboration,” Prism 7, no. 3 
(July 1, 2018): 51–67, 52; Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 1, 2014), 
https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA603433. 
11 Kosal, 52. 
12 Rebecca K. Hersman, Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What’s at Stake? 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
December 1, 2004), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA446028. 
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encompasses “activities centered on securing and destroying material and delivery 
systems; but, more broadly, it also entails activities intended to address the associated 
programs, infrastructure, and expertise” represented in counterproliferation.13 
b. The Importance of CWMD and Counterproliferation 
As United States national security strategies shift focus over time, CWMD has 
remained a high-stakes priority. The Department of Defense Strategy for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction "seeks to ensure that the United States and its allies and 
partners are neither attacked nor coerced by actors with WMD.”14 The strategy “outlines 
three end states: no new WMD possession, no WMD use, and minimization of WMD 
effects.”15 Additionally, it outlines four objectives: 
These objectives are to reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ 
WMD; to increase the barriers to WMD acquisition, proliferation, and use; 
to manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and 
safe havens; and to deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats 
through layered, integrated defenses.16 
These goals are reflected in numerous “national and department-level strategy 
documents, to include the National Security Strategy (NSS); the National Military Strategy 
(NMS); the National Defense Strategy (NDS); the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG); and 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).17 CWMD literature and briefings by government 
officials consistently underline the “complex, fluid, shifting national security 
environment.”18  
While the intergovernmental and international interpretations of counter-
proliferation are varied, the standardized definitions of CWMD-related terms are closely 
                                                 
13 Kosal, 52. 
14 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction," v. 
15 Department Of Defense, v. 
16 Department Of Defense, v. 
17 Kosal, 51. 
18 “Press Briefing with DARPA Director Arati Prabhakar from the Pentagon,” U.S. Department of 
Defense, April 24, 2018, https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDOD/bulletins/782dcf. 
5 
related. CWMD, counterproliferation, and pathway defeat definitions are noticeably 
similar. Recalling counterproliferation’s definition as “those actions taken to reduce the 
risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and 
partners,” one can see how it closely reflects the definition of CWMD.19 That definition 
described CWMD as: 
Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, 
development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related 
expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.20 
Comparing the two side-by-side helps to show that CWMD is a broader description of 
“efforts” whereas counterproliferation focuses on “actions.” Pathway defeat’s definition 
also uses the word actions. The DoD defines pathway defeat as: 
Deliberate actions against actors of concern and their networks to delay, 
disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate the conceptualization, 
development, possession, and proliferation of WMD, related expertise, 
materials, technologies, and means of delivery.21 
With pathway defeat, the difference lies in the emphasis on networks and implies a 
preventative stance in the term itself. Pathway defeat represents a proactive approach 
oriented on networks, while counterproliferation is less specific. The modest increase in 
specificity of these terms within DoD is perhaps an indication of increased attention to the 
hazards of proliferation.  
c. Supporting Interdiction and Application 
While the complexity of CWMD and counterproliferation is widely acknowledged, 
discussions surrounding the mechanics of achieving the policy are comparatively scarce. 
Understandably, there are security constraints and compartmentalization issues to consider. 
However, there is space for discourse surrounding policy implementation (e.g., weighing 
capabilities and limitations) that remains largely untouched – even with these 
                                                 
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 54. 
20 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 17. 
21 Department of Defense, 17. 
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considerations. As the literature generally favors counterproliferation over later stage 
WMD-elimination, examination of the opportunities and threats inherent in 
implementation for such an important issue is prudent. However, current scholarship 
admits that relatively indefinite recommendations for implementation point to a need for 
further research to explore potential solutions and develop innovative applications for 
existing capabilities.22 To the extent possible, academic examination should inform 
compartmented and classified decisions supporting policy. An unclassified study gleaning 
lessons learned from historic SOF missions may well contribute to academic discourse that 
supports these decisions. 
2. Special Operations 
Current literature on special operations suggests that USSOCOM is uniquely suited 
to synchronize counterproliferation efforts for the Department of Defense.23  
a. Responsibility for Counterproliferation Coordination 
While the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) previously held the 
responsibility for counterproliferation coordination, Dan Lamothe, a reporter for The 
Washington Post, reported that counterproliferation competed for prioritization within that 
command: 
One senior defense official who has worked on the mission to counter 
weapons of mass destruction said that Strategic Command “has rarely 
invested the necessary political and intellectual capital” to push for issues 
pertaining to countering weapons of mass destruction. The official 
attributed that to the Pentagon not having U.S. forces designated 
                                                 
22 Margaret Kosal, “CWMD Strategy Gap: Capacities, Capabilities, and Collaboration”; Gerstein, 
“SOCOM Will Soon Lead the Pentagon’s Anti-WMD Efforts. Here’s What It Still Needs.”; See also Erik J. 
Stanfield, “Lost in Translation: Lessons from Counterterrorism for a More Proactive Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Strategy” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 59, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55539. 
23 Dan Lamothe, “Special Operations Command Takes a Lead Role in Countering Weapons of Mass 




specifically to countering weapons of mass destruction and an “overall low 
sense of priority as compared to its other missions.”24 
As another functional combatant command much like USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM has a 
transregional portfolio, with accompanying partnerships, but, unlike USSTRATCOM, has 
assigned forces capable of being trained and tasked to support counterproliferation 
initiatives in coordination with geographic combatant commands.25 Admiral William 
McRaven highlighted USSOCOM’s connection to “strategy to capability development to 
resourcing” in SOCOM 2020.26 This connection was translated into responsibility for 
coordination of CWMD, as noted by Director Vayl Oxford, of the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, a partner of USSOCOM in CWMD efforts:  
As the Coordinating Authority for CWMD, SOCOM integrates DoD plans 
and intelligence priorities to support operations against state and non-state 
networks that possess or seek WMD, and executes global operations against 
the same—in coordination with other Combatant Commands.27 
While USSOCOM has many strengths to draw from, it must avoid the “pitfalls that 
hindered [US]STRATCOM in executing the counter-WMD mission” by balancing 
competing priorities.28 Additional authorities come with additional expectations, including 
investment and attention to counterproliferation – both represent criticisms levied against 
USSTRATCOM prior to coordination authority’s transfer to USSOCOM.29  
                                                 
24 Lamothe. 
25 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, explains the Unified 
Command Plan (UCP), as approved by the President, delineates functional combatant commands (II-2). 
Functional combatant commands are responsible for a – typically – global security issue necessitating 
single responsibility (II-7). The functional combatant command is charged with coordinating operations 
related to their specified responsibilities (JP-1, II-7). 
26 U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command: Forging the Tip of the 
Spear (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2017), i. 
27 Vayl Oxford, “Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy Policy and Programs for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) for Fiscal Year 2019" (statement of Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director, 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency), House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities (2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20180322/108018/HHRG-115-
AS26-Wstate-OxfordV-20180322.pdf. 
28 Gerstein, “SOCOM Will Soon Lead the Pentagon’s Anti-WMD Efforts. Here’s What It Still Needs.” 
29 Gerstein. 
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b. Transition to SOCOM 
The nature of special operations and SOF made USSOCOM’s selection as the 
coordinating authority for counterproliferation appealing. Charters and Tugwell outline 
special operations as 
Small-scale, clandestine, of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, 
undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support 
of foreign policy.30  
Colin Gray praised the above “superior definition” while underlining the strategic 
utility and reliability of SOF: 
That utility reposes most essentially in two qualities, economy of force and 
expansion of strategic choice. In the most general of terms, special 
operations forces (SOF) offer the prospect of a favorably disproportionate 
return on military investment. Moreover, SOF provide the possibility of a 
range of precisely conducted military activities more extensive than that 
reliably feasible for regular warriors conducting regular operations.31 
In 2006, James Kiras provided a more recent definition in Special Operations and 
Strategy: 
Unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained 
campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to enable conventional 
operations and/or resolve economically politico-military problems at the 
operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish 
with conventional forces alone.32 
The Department of Defense’s definition also captures applicable traits that overlap with 
what DoD would need to leverage for CWMD: 
Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, 
equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: 
time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through 
                                                 
30 Charters, D. and Tugwell, M. “Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 
1980s,” in Barnett, F.R., Hugh Tovar, B., and Shultz, R.H. (eds) Special Operations in US Strategy, 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 9. 
31 Gray, 2, 23. 
32 James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism, 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 5. 
9 
indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of 
risk.33 
The expectation that USSOCOM’s unique capabilities, organizations, and people are equal 
to the task of confronting this difficult undertaking is behind the decision to transition 
coordinating authority to USSOCOM. Historically, SOF organizations have repeatedly 
tackled intricate problems. The above arguments regarding the nature of special operations 
support the contention that special operations forces are suitable to confront 
counterproliferation issues. Additionally, lessons from historic special operations 
challenges may be cogent today as well as informing the heretofore limited conversation 
regarding how SOF can best integrate and coordinate CWMD efforts. 
Matching the consequences of WMD proliferation with the capabilities of 
USSOCOM was complemented by the reasoning that a single, unified command should 
confront the possible transregional nature of adversaries’ proliferation efforts.34 
Underscoring its importance, President Obama stated, “No threat poses as grave a danger 
to our security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons.”35 In August 2016, 
he followed Secretary Ash Carter’s recommendation and modified the Unified Command 
Plan to transfer responsibility to USSOCOM.36 
3. Special Operations Forces Capabilities 
While there is no shortage of literature covering a range of special operations 
missions and capabilities, literature focusing on how special operations fits within 
counterproliferation initiatives is scarce. Thomas K. Adams writes that SOF’s role in 
counterproliferation as described in unclassified documents is “too vague to really allow 
                                                 
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, 2014, GL-11. 
34 Hersman, Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
35 Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 
36 “Presidential Memorandum—Delegation of Authority of Unified Command Plan Responsibilities,” 
White House, August 5, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/08/05/presidential-memorandum-delegation-authority-unified-command-plan; Lamothe, 
“Special Operations Command Takes a Lead Role in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
10 
anyone to focus resources on it.”37 He continues by relaying that “there is an idea that, by 
accepting many missions, SOF demonstrates its fitness and remains competitive… for a 
share of the diminishing military budget.”38 This unfavorable view accompanies the 
inclusion of counterproliferation in SOF’s core activities as “intended to make a political-
policy point that the US government opposes proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and will use ‘military power’ to do so, when and if appropriate.”39 These points are well 
taken, but the utility of examining SOF’s role remains a consideration if the credibility of 
the above policy point is to be established. It is also reasonable to evaluate SOF’s role and 
how existing capabilities can be used for this mission, even if there are critiques to address.  
DoD aligns SOF with counterproliferation initiatives in recognition of the 
exceptional nature of the counterproliferation problem (i.e. the strategic impact of 
proliferation/counterproliferation). DoD codifies this in Joint Publication 3-05 Special 
Operations within the list of 12 special operations core activities: 
• Direct action 
• Special reconnaissance 
• Countering weapons of mass destruction 
• Counterterrorism 
• Unconventional warfare 
• Foreign internal defense 
• Security force assistance 
• Hostage rescue and recovery 
                                                 
37 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London: Routledge, 1998), 303, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=1024696. 
38 Adams, 303. 
39 Adams, 303. 
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• Counterinsurgency 
• Foreign humanitarian assistance 
• Military information support operations 
• Civil affairs operations40 
JP 3-05 continues by outlining: 
USSOCOM supports [Geographic Combatant Commands] through 
technical expertise, materiel, and special teams to complement other CCMD 
teams that locate, tag, and track WMD; DA in limited access areas; helping 
build partnership capacity to conduct CWMD activities; MISO to dissuade 
adversaries from reliance on WMD; and other specialized capabilities.41 
While this selection briefly describes different SOF activities that support CWMD, it is 
worth noting that both JP 3-05 and Joint Publication 3-40 Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction were published two years prior to President Obama’s update to the Unified 
Command Plan and USSOCOM’s assumption of its current role. The chronology indicates 
that USSOCOM’s supporting role in terms of providing trained forces to geographic 
combatant commanders has matured into the additional responsibility of coordinating these 
activities. As of this writing, the doctrine – the common language and understanding within 
DoD – informing this additional aspect of USSOCOM’s role is still evolving. Published 
CWMD-related doctrine predates SOCOM’s assumption of its coordinating authority.42 
Given the recentness of the change, the academic body of work exploring the subject is 
also thin. For example, how is the coordinating dynamic strengthening or hindering the 
SOF capabilities relative to CWMD? SOF’s ability to build partner capacity to increase the 
efficacy of CMWD efforts may be more resonant under this dynamic but has not been 
examined. United States Special Operations Command prominently displays the SOF 
Truths on their website:  
                                                 
40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, x. 
41 Department of Defense, II-7. 
42 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; Department 
of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
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• Humans are more important than Hardware 
• Quality is better than Quantity 
• Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced 
• Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies 
occur 
• Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance43 
These truths are referenced in doctrine that describes to SOF’s potential to shape “potential 
environments,” gain a “deep understanding of local conditions,” and to build partner 
capacity.44 While it is justifiable to continue to stress these aspects of SOF, it is also 
beneficial to address the application of these capabilities to CWMD to support more 
comprehensive efforts in this area. As Adams notes, counterproliferation as a core task is 
intended to reflect policy and represents a willingness apply military force. This will 
manifest in supporting tactical tasks and operations that will ultimately achieve CWMD 
objectives. In doing so, these actions would in turn be considered counterproliferation. 
Linked to an overall approach, they would contribute to pathway defeat. As such, SOF’s 
talents of building partner capacity can also be leveraged to build partnerships within the 
United States government within USSOCOM and across government agencies to produce 
synergy and emphasis that the problem has been lacking. 
The problem of proliferation will continue to be difficult, but it is not one that 
should be ignored or marginalized. Merely assigning SOF to a challenging mission is not 
a panacea. Study remains to be done. 
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4. Current Thinking on Implementation 
Many scholars support the implementation of the pathway defeat concept, but there 
are few discussions that go beyond esoteric, general terms concerning SOF’s participation 
as recommended.45 Rediscovering—or discovering—that counterproliferation is an 
encompassing collection of tasks aimed at achieving potential CWMD objectives would 
remove the opacity and mystique of counterproliferation as something wholly new within 
academic discourse. In other words, the objective is what makes a given task 
characteristically counterproliferation. As such, there is a wide array of SOF tactical tasks 
and capabilities that can be applied to CWMD goals. The inaccurate notion that there is a 
completely different menu of essential tasks specific to counterproliferation potentially 
confounds debate. Injecting historical case studies of SOF operations to achieve CWMD 
objectives into the academic conversation demonstrates this insight and helps reinvigorate 
stalled discussion caused by painting with a counterproliferation broad brush. 
Recalling DoD’s definition of pathway defeat as “activities [that] focus on actions 
to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate conceptualization, development, 
possession, and proliferation of WMD” lends itself to this more proactive stance.46 Many 
agencies join academia’s assessment with emphasis on “efforts to ‘the left of boom,’ i.e., 
non-proliferation and arms control.”47 While this approach is likely to strike a reader as 
efficient and sensible, there is a risk in presuming these traits will translate to success 
without rigorous consideration. Kosal summarizes the disconnect between strategy and 
multiple phases of CWMD: 
While a prevention strategy is laudable and important, the disparity between 
strategy and the required operational capabilities and capacities needed for 
securing, interdicting, and eliminating WMD reveals potential gaps that 
                                                 
45 Margaret Kosal, “CWMD Strategy Gap: Capacities, Capabilities, and Collaboration”; Lonnie 
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must be recognized and accounted for to ensure a credible deterrent 
posture.48 
Despite the advocacy for proactive efforts, scholarship discussing implementation is often 
vague and uncritical, which allows for the faulty perception that SOF attributes and 
activities are automatically optimally translated to these approaches. 
Aside from classification constraints and prudent compartmentalization of 
information, openings to discuss possibilities for SOF’s increased effectiveness exist. In 
2002, LTC Walter Herd recommended a “global reconnaissance” role for special 
operations units (specifically, U.S. Army Special Forces) exercised through surrogate 
forces to gather information in the context of a counterproliferation mission.49 More 
recently in 2016, Colonel Lonnie Carlson compares proliferation pathway defeat to 
counterterrorism and counternarcotics.50 He states that the resident capabilities of network 
analysis, non-lethal targeting, and non-lethal targeting within SOF should be combined 
with SOF’s ability to “leverage security cooperation activities” to create partners to support 
WMD pathway defeat.51 SOF familiar with the nuance of each operational environment 
must navigate the potentially competing considerations of U.S. and host nation goals. 
Together, these works wedge the door open for the topic of SOF’s role in CWMD, which 
could be strengthened with historical examples of SOF’s capabilities and translated to 
CWMD efforts emphasizing “early action through pathway defeat, shaping the 
environment to dissuade actors from pursuing WMD, and cooperating with partners to 
achieve countering WMD goals.”52 
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5. Projected Findings 
SOF’s attributes and capabilities suggest a compatibility with CWMD while 
revealing that much of the topic is unexplored in depth. Observations of the WMD 
elimination mission as “still in its infant stages” also indicate that “support among the 
services and commands is tenuous, and concepts and capabilities are still lacking.”53 This 
observation can arguably apply to the overall CWMD effort, particularly in the case of 
SOF integration and coordination, based on the relatively recent change. Additionally, 
technological changes further lend to the dynamic nature of the situation. According to 
Oxford, “Rapidly evolving technologies… are both exacerbating existing threats and 
making WMD… more diffuse and accessible, and not just to nation states.”54 He continues 
by agreeing with many others that have noted a threat “comprised of complex global 
networks that require a shift in our approach to prevent proliferation and use.”55  
While attempting to identify case studies of SOF’s role in CWMD is challenging, 
finding – at least – analogous scenarios that are demonstrative of SOF’s attributes and their 
prospective usefulness to SOF’s doctrinal approach to CWMD may be more feasible. 
Applying observations rooted in historical events to CWMD would enable a beneficial, 
inductive projection onto the intersection of CWMD and SOF.  
The concept of pathway defeat and exploration of SOF experiences in analogous 
scenarios could prove useful to evaluate SOF’s future utility concerning CWMD. 
Identifying lessons learned from SOF’s history can inform and enhance the application of 
capabilities. 
Similar principles and capabilities that led to SOCOM’s designation as a desirable 
coordinator for counterproliferation activities can be examined and compared to historical 
SOF activities to shed light on the capabilities, limitations, and expectations that policy-
makers should understand with respect to SOF’s ability to affect the counterproliferation 
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mission. Identifying gaps or opportunities for efficiencies is a worthy goal considering the 
wide-ranging – and potentially catastrophic – consequences in the realm of CWMD. 
Likewise, understanding and reinforcing opportunities are important to avoid conflating 
reorganization with progress. Being aware of a problem’s complexity is necessary, but only 
underscores it as an issue that bears further, and more intense, scrutiny. 
C. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
Counterproliferation of nuclear weapons and dual-use material presents an 
interesting and weighty security problem in which special operations forces are being asked 
to assume an increasingly central role. To determine cogent lessons from SOF’s history 
informing the suitability of its role in counterproliferation, research began with a survey of 
SOF principles and concepts. Next, a historical analysis of two representative case studies 
was evaluated to judge the success of the operations and adherence to the aforementioned 
principles and concepts. This heuristic serial case study framework allowed each case to 
contribute to more generalizable conclusions and interrelationships between cases, and 
reflected the deliberate evaluation pursued.56 
The first case examines Operation Gunnerside, the successful Allied sabotage of 
heavy water production in Norway during World War II. The second case discusses the 
Alsos Missions, which were U.S. activities aimed at securing nuclear material and 
scientists while preventing their exploitation by advancing Soviet Forces in the waning 
days of WWII.  
These case studies offer opportunities for inductive observations related to SOF 
capabilities that can help inform SOF’s role in contemporary counterproliferation pursuits. 
This inductive approach lends itself to generalization.  
  
                                                 
56 Harry Eckstein outlines the heuristic (meaning “serving to find out”) case study as one method to 
carry out social science studies. Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, 
and Change (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 143. 
17 
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND HISTORY 
We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form 
up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our 
employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps 
because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new 
situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the 
illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and 
demoralization. 
—Charlton Ogburn 
author and former military officer 57 
 
Ogburn, a former military officer with the famed Merrill’s Marauders, penned the 
opening quote to this section for a Harper’s Magazine article in 1957 as part of his account 
of the World War II Burma Campaign. In a period of rapidly evolving technologies and 
expanding roles for USSOCOM and SOF in general, looking to representative historical 
special operations could serve to ground SOF’s adaptations to efficiently confront 
emerging problems and offer well-informed solutions to emerging problems that are, 
perhaps, not as new as they may appear. In this way, decision-makers can attempt to avoid 
the pitfall of mistaking unnecessary reorganization for progress. 
Considering the significant consequences of the prospect of proliferation, this thesis 
asserts that historical case studies yield lessons learned that inform the suitability of SOF’s 
role within counterproliferation efforts that can help guide development of SOF 
counterproliferation-related missions. The important aspects of each case form the basis of 
the evaluation: the agility of SOF in relation to the success of the mission being examined. 
In other words, if the conditions enabling an organization’s agility are present, an 
organization is more likely to be successful in its counterproliferation role. The case studies 
indicate a positive relationship between SOF’s utility relative to counterproliferation stems 
from the agility these forces are afforded during the conduct of the operation. Trust and 
effective delegation, organizational coordination, informed initiative, and unique 
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capabilities form aspects of “agility” that contribute to the degree of success these forces 
are characteristically capable of achieving, which can be generalized to 
counterproliferation problems. Conversely, an absence or degradation of agility, 
represented by these qualities, limits the prospects for success in the same regard. 
The historical analysis of each case study will highlight aspects of “agility,” which 
is defined in Simon Reay Atkinson and James Moffat’s The Agile Organization as “an 
ability of the forces to adapt, to learn, and to change to meet the threats they face.”58 
Notably, “change” does not always manifest as a tectonic shift in organization structure, 
but can represent adjustments in authorities, permissions, flattening of communication 
conventions, coordination protocols, and informed initiative. Agility implies a freedom of 
action that empowers an organization to adjust their approach to meet mission objectives. 
In cases where organizations charged with achieving special objectives, agility that 
included the ability to pursue “the range of actions available” succeeded in the strategically 
important tasks that were entrusted in them.59 
Operation Gunnerside and the Alsos Mission will showcase agility’s role in the 
success of an organization during the conduct of counterproliferation actions and the 
viability of SOF’s role in pathway defeat through operations exhibiting foundational 
essential tasks. The salient points of these cases can be applied to contemporary cases as a 
basis for comparison. There is insight in these historical cases for larger organizations 
exploring the utility of SOF’s counterproliferation role. 
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II. OPERATION GUNNERSIDE 
The German cars went towards Vemork on the road right below us. Nobody 
must have thought that we would go toward Rjukan. At 0500, we were at 
Gvepseborg. And we felt great satisfaction when we sat and looked at 
Vemork and thought of all the commotion we had caused down there. 
 —Claus Helberg, 
Linge Company member60 
 
Operation Gunnerside has been hailed as the most successful and important Allied 
act of sabotage during the Second World War.61 In 1940, Norwegian commandos trained 
by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) raided the Vemork Hydroelectric plant 
to destroy what was deemed an essential element of Nazi Germany’s atomic weapons 
program. With Norway under German occupation, the Germans took control of the 
Vemork plant and exploited its status as “the first industrial-scale production site of heavy 
water in the world.”62 The plant produced deuterium oxide (more commonly known as 
“heavy water”), which was critical to the Nazi’s strategy for developing an atomic 
weapon.63 In April 1939, the Nazis began a secret weapons program named “Uranverein,” 
or “Uranium Club,” led by prominent German physicists and drawing from “the top 
scientific minds in Germany.”64 Among those was Werner Karl Heisenberg, a Nobel 
laureate in physics.65 
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The German scientists elected to utilize the rare heavy water molecule as a 
moderator for their process. A nascent atomic weapon requires numerous components; two 
materials are particularly difficult to procure—uranium and heavy water.66 The Atomic 
Heritage Foundation summarized deuterium oxide (D2O, or “heavy water”) in their 2017 
article: 
Deuterium oxide (D2O) or “heavy water” is a water molecule made with 
two deuterium ions rather than two hydrogen ions. Deuterium is an isotope 
of hydrogen whose nucleus includes a neutron in addition to a proton and 
electron. This additional neutron causes the deuterium to have a higher 
molecular weight and thus form “heavy water” when combined with 
oxygen.67 
Heavy water’s role as a moderator is to slow the “bombardment of neutrons and control 
the fission process,” which helps to complete the necessary chain reaction.68 While the 
American program selected comparatively readily available graphite as a moderator, the 
German scientists chose to work with heavy water – a molecule that exists on at only a 
“one to 41 million molecule ratio” with regular water.69 Uranium production can occur 
through several means, but at the time, heavy water production was extremely limited, 
making it a critical vulnerability to the German program.70 When German forces captured 
Norway in 1940, they gained access to existing infrastructure that would satiate their 
demand for heavy water to support atomic experimentation. Allied leaders regarded the 
heavy water plant near the town of Rjukan as resting “on the thin line separating victory 
and defeat.”71 Allied decision-makers were concerned that Germany could achieve a shift 
in momentum if the Nazi-sponsored scientists could realize their atomic program’s goals.  
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The members of the commando team responsible for this successful mission were 
natives of Norway’s resistance against Nazi occupation. These commandos received 
training from the SOE in Great Britain and constituted “Company Linge,” the Norwegian 
branch of SOE activities.72 Their collaboration with the SOE to target the Vemork plant 
adheres to Colin Gray’s definition of special operations through economy of force and 
“expansion of strategic choice” to the Allies and the important operation leaves little doubt 
of its counterproliferation objective.73 Thus, Operation Gunnerside is a principal example 
of a direct action mission that aligned with a pathway defeat approach and accomplishment 
of CWMD objectives.  
A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
When Major Leif Tronstadt saw that the suicide capsules had been distributed, 
which offered a last resort to the commandos in the event of capture, he said, “I cannot tell 
you why this mission is so important, but if you succeed, it will live in Norway’s memory 
for a hundred years.”74 The commandos of Operation Gunnerside were following an 
unsuccessful attempt by British commandos, under the auspices of Operation Freshman, to 
destroy the heavy water production facilities months before, and would be joining the 
Norwegian advance force that had infiltrated into extremely difficult environmental 
conditions in October 1942.75 The SOE and members of Company Linge optimized their 
organization’s agility and substantially increased the prospects of mission accomplishment 
despite daunting obstacles. First, Major (and Professor) Tronstadt’s involvement in the 
planning of the mission contributed substantial scientific expertise, local resistance 
experience, and familiarity with the Norsk-Hydro Plant. Second, team members were 
informed to the extent that the mission’s compartmentalization would allow, providing 
them with enough background information and familiarity with the mission’s importance 
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to facilitate disciplined initiative. Third, empowered subordinate leaders made effective 
adjustments to the existing plan to take advantage of on-the-ground knowledge and updated 
assessments of the situation. Last, a specially selected, resilient, and well-trained force was 
able to overcome significant known and unforeseen obstacles to destroy their target, 
achieving notable disruptions in the Nazi atomic program. 
1. Tronstadt’s Involvement 
Tronstadt’s connection to the Vemork Plant’s heavy water production, the 
Norwegian Resistance, and SOE provided invaluable expertise and intimate knowledge 
essential to enable effective planning and execution of the raid. In 1933, Professor 
Tronstadt’s research led to a collaboration with Jomar Brun, Norsk Hydro’s director of its 
hydrogen electrolysis plant.76 Together, the two designed Vemork’s heavy water 
production facilities, which would yield approximately 100 grams of heavy water by 1935 
after adapting existing processes at the plant originally designed to create ammonia for 
fertilizer.77 With Germany’s invasion and rapidly expanding grip in Norway beginning in 
April 1940, Tronstadt urged his students at the Norwegian Institute of Technology to 
muster at their assigned mobilization locations while he proceeded to Oslo to report for 
duty per his standing orders in the Norwegian Corps of Weaponry.78 While en route he 
discovered that Oslo had already been taken, so he began organizing resistance fighters in 
the familiar terrain of the Dovre Mountains.79 When the Allied forces withdrew and 
Norwegian forces capitulated in late 1940, Tronstadt resumed instructing at Trondheim’s 
university while joining the underground resistance forces in their continued struggle 
against Nazi forces.80 His reporting became an important aspect of British insight into 
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German activity in Norway and observations proved useful in informing future planning 
in which he was later involved. 
Notably, Leif Tronstadt began anonymously reporting German interest in heavy 
water to British intelligence via his connections in the resistance and the Vemork Plant.81 
Specifically, Tronstadt was able to discover that the Germans were examining ways to 
significantly increase production of the scarce heavy water.82 As 1941 drew to a close, 
“output… exceeded previous production rates by 100 kg more per month and totaled four 
kilograms per day.”83 
Tronstadt continued to evade capture by the Gestapo by traveling to Britain via 
Sweden and joined the Allied Technical Council and assisted the SOE in building the 
technical and intelligence picture that contributed to Allied assessment of German 
intentions regarding their atomic program.84 Early on, he contributed to intelligence that 
enabled the successful aerial bombing of a Nazi missile-testing site near the German port 
of Peenemunde and was able to round out British assessments of Vemork’s ability to 
advance the German program and its vulnerabilities.85 Because of his involvement with the 
construction of the plant’s heavy water production, Tronstadt understood that a bombing 
raid was unlikely to produce a favorable initial result. The facilities were in a subterranean 
level of the plant, sheltered by numerous floors of steel-reinforced concrete.86 Secondly, 
he wanted to limit the risk of civilian casualties in the nearby village of Rjukan and 
Norwegian workers at the plant that would arise from an inaccurate aerial bombing raid.87 
Jomar Brun, Tronstadt’s partner in the construction of the heavy water facilities, continued 
to work at the plant and was also exposed to risk from such a raid. Brun, likewise, was 
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providing valuable intelligence and attempting to subvert ongoing heavy water production 
to the extent that Winston Churchill requested his exfiltration to Britain, underscoring the 
attention the issue of heavy water production received.88 While American generals 
continued to push for a bombing raid, British SOE authorities were convinced of the 
efficacy of a commando raid, in no small part by Tronstadt’s assessments and 
recommendations. The SOE’s interpretation of his information expanded options, enabling 
a change to the Allied default of a mass bombing raid and offered the expansion of choice 
to decision-makers. The SOE raid would represent a more agile option stemming from 
Tronstadt’s credibility and the SOE’s assessment. Although both bombing and ground 
operations were successively undertaken to halt heavy water production, special operations 
proved more effective than air raids. 
2. Information and Agility 
The Company Linge commandos that would constitute the combined raiding force 
of Operations Grouse (later named “Swallow” by the SOE) and Gunnerside would have 
enough information and familiarity with the mission’s importance to facilitate appropriate 
initiative and inform their decisions on the ground. To be sure, the team members did not 
have “perfect information.” They did not have a total appreciation for the high stakes of 
the mission in which they were involved. Gunnerside’s team leader Joachim Ronneberg 
said in a 2017 interview, “The first time I heard about atom bombs and heavy water was 
after the Americans dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then we started to 
understand our raid.”89 Despite the delayed appreciation for the enormity of the specter of 
atomic destruction, Tronstadt was able to convince the commandos of the mission’s 
importance for Norway and the war effort, and inform them of the significance of the plant 
as an important component of the Germans’ weapons research.90 Ronneberg himself 
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recruited each member of the team individually and informed them of the inherent risks, 
skills required, and “great importance attributed to its success.”91 
Operation Grouse, an eventual component of Operation Gunnerside, was able to 
apply the appreciation for the severity of the mission’s consequences to inform their 
extended advanced force operation. Intended as the advance force for an earlier 40-man 
British commando assault force (known as Operation Freshman) targeting the plant, the 
five member team infiltrated ahead of the main force to conduct reconnaissance and 
prepare landing sites for the assault force’s gliders.92 However, the Operation Freshman 
commandos encountered “bad weather and communications issues” that led to the crash 
landing of Freshman’s gliders far from their intended landing zone – challenges that are to 
be expected in high risk, high payoff missions with narrow windows of opportunity.93 This 
ultimately led to the destruction of the initial assault force by way of the crash itself or by 
subsequent execution of crash survivors by Gestapo forces invoking Adolf Hitler’s 
Commando Order.94 The Gestapo determined the target of the costly raid to be Vemork 
and German forces strengthened the garrison billeted at the plant.95 Thus, SOE deliberated 
between a proposed bombing run and another ground assault. Meanwhile, Grouse 
resiliently remained clandestine for months in the harsh conditions of the Norwegian winter 
with no guarantee that another mission would be forthcoming to provide the opportunity 
for an operation like Gunnerside to succeed.96 With the residual possibilities of excessive 
collateral damage and doubtful effectiveness, a bombing raid was again forestalled in favor 
of another commando raid – aided by Grouse. 
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3. Effective Adjustments 
The SOE empowered subordinate leaders to make effective adjustments to existing 
plans to capitalize on developing information and updated assessments of the situation. In 
the wake of Operation Freshman’s costly defeat, Colonel John Wilson, head of the 
Norwegian section of the SOE, requested to take over planning for the mission to sabotage 
heavy water production at Vemork.97 He favored alterations to the infiltration plan and 
empowered Tronstadt and Ronneberg to select their own team.98 Adjusting to German 
measures to strengthen security at the plant against a robust assault force after Operation 
Freshman, the SOE and Company Linge would attempt to use a small force and stealth to 
find seams to exploit during the operation. 
Six Norwegians from Company Linge constituted the small element codenamed 
Operation Gunnerside, which would combine with the Grouse element (newly designated 
as “Swallow,” in keeping with the avian theme SOE had established for them) already on 
the ground.99 The smaller Gunnerside team would infiltrate by parachute – rather than via 
glider – and use their collectively strong skiing ability to aid their movements during 
infiltration and movement to the plant itself.100 Prior to departing Britain, SOE planners 
(including Tronstadt) and team members identified three potential access methods to their 
target: 
1. Descend from the mountains that dominated the plant’s location, which 
was an area the Germans had laced with mines 
2. Cross a single lane suspension bridge, which was heavily-guarded 
3. Maneuver through a gorge adjacent to the plant, fording a nearly frozen 
river, and ascend a 500 foot cliff101 
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After Ronneberg led his team out of the aircraft carrying them over Norway under 
parachute and through a “cover of snowfall at around midnight on February 16, 1943,” the 
team consolidated with members of Operation Grouse and updated their understanding of 
the situation.102 Members of Grouse expressed their reservations regarding the first two 
infiltration options and argued for a line of attack taking them through the gorge.103 The 
day prior to the attack, the combined team sent Claus Helberg as a scout to confirm the 
difficult route through the gorge was actually accessible.104 Once confirmed the combined 
Gunnerside team proceeded according to their updated plan.  
The Linge Company members passed through the gorge undetected and exhibited 
additional examples of adjusting effectively. They penetrated an unguarded segment of the 
perimeter near a railroad track they identified through Grouse’s intelligence gathering 
using wire shears Ronneberg obtained on his own at a hardware in Britain while on leave 
from training.105 Ronneberg had previously decided that the British military-issued hand 
saw would, in his words, “have taken too much time, made too much noise, and alerted 
Nazi guards.”106  
Once at the building housing the heavy water facilities, the explosives teams sought 
entry. According to Helberg, there was “some difficulties” getting into the factory.107 With 
the doors locked, only two men were able to find the previously identified access tunnel.108 
Ronneberg recalled: 
Getting inside I was quite certain that the rest of the party would follow me, 
but only one chap came. The other ones hadn’t found the entrance to the 
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tunnel. Therefore we decided we would have to do it ourselves and started 
laying out the charges.109 
As the first two began emplacing their explosives, a team member who was unable to locate 
the same tunnel “decided to act on his own” and broke a window to gain access to crawl 
inside to assist his teammates.110 Together the men cut the fuses to a minimal time of 30 
seconds to mitigate the risk of the explosives being removed before they could destroy their 
target.111 The explosives were measured and emplaced well – they successfully destroyed 
the heavy water machinery without excessively damaging the rest of the building, which 
afforded the team the opportunity to put considerable distance between them and the plant 
before the destruction was detected by the garrison.112 Helberg noted that the team was 
able to observe the factory from a distant ridgeline before their actions had been discovered. 
He recalled they “felt great satisfaction when we sat and looked at Vemork and thought of 
all the commotion we had caused down there.”113 These individual decisions underscore 
the imperative impressed upon the team early on by Tronstadt and the SOE planners, and 
highlight the individual initiative under dynamic circumstances during the course of the 
mission. 
4. Specially Selected  
The commandos of Operation Gunnerside were specially selected, well-trained, 
well-prepared, and agile, allowing them to overcome significant obstacles involving the 
success of their mission. Their raid destroyed the heavy water production facility, 
associated supplies, 500 kilograms of the valuable deuterium oxide itself, and 
decommissioned the plant for months.114 This success started with their recruitment and 
training in Britain following the invasion of Norway. They prepared and “completed 
grueling training in Scotland that featured night exercises like climbing mountains, fording 
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rivers, and camping outdoors for weeks.”115 Subsequently, the men of Operation Grouse 
were compelled to subside on severely limited supplies, hunting wild reindeer and 
otherwise living off the land in the frigid temperature of the mountain plateau 
Hardangervidda.116 This endurance and skill contributed to the success of Operation 
Gunnerside; the intelligence the combined Gunnerside element garnered from Grouse’s 
time on the ground added to their adaptability.  
The selected group’s training also aided the unit’s ability to complete an arduous 
planned withdrawal while being pursued by entire formations of German soldiers. The 
Hardangervidda Plateau could, according to Norwegian legend, “grow cold enough, 
quickly enough, to freeze flames in a fire.”117 According to Neal Bascomb’s work The 
Winter Fortress, these conditions could result in death for an underprepared individual in 
two hours.118 Yet, the Gunnerside explosives team was able to ski 200 miles to Sweden to 
exfiltrate occupied Norway while none of the other members were killed or permanently 
captured.119 
B. EFFECTS AND ANALYSIS 
The mission effectively disrupted the heavy water production, an effect the 
subsequent air bombardments complemented. While it is true that the raid did not 
permanently halt heavy water production, it significantly impeded progress and halted 
production until May 1943.120 During his inspection of the mangled heavy water facility, 
German General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst assessed that the attackers were “clearly 
military,” and that the attack was a “most splendid coup.”121 
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It is likely the raid had a political and allocation impact within the Nazi Regime. 
Albert Speer, Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production, wrote in his memoir: 
On the suggestion of the nuclear physicists we scuttled the project to 
develop an atom bomb by the autumn of 1942, after I had again queried 
them about deadlines and been told that we could not count on anything for 
three or four years. The war would certainly have been decided long before 
then. Instead I authorized the development of an energy-producing uranium 
motor for propelling machinery. The navy was interested in that for its 
submarines.122 
While Speer’s asserted that the program was scuttled prior to the raid, heavy water 
production nevertheless continued. While the Germans were unwilling to “invest in a 
Manhattan-style nuclear program,” a breakthrough with the fission process aided by heavy 
water may well have reversed the ebbing interest amongst Nazi decision makers.123 Kurt 
Diebner, director of the Nazi nuclear program, was told by his superiors, “You get a heavy 
water reactor going, you prove to us you can do it, and we will shower you with money.”124 
Unexpectedly, Operation Freshman may have infused more momentum into the German 
program. The failed attack signaled that both sides were exploring similar types of atomic 
research.125 Given that the Allies risked a hazardous mission to destroy means to a German 
atomic weapon, it indicated that the Allies were also pursuing an atomic weapons 
program.126 Operation Freshman’s failure made Operation Gunnerside’s success more 
significant in this sense. Gunnerside further complicated German researchers’ frustrations 
with heavy water’s “limited effectiveness in comparison to graphite,” and contributed to 
bureaucratic friction and the dearth of “support for the German atomic bomb program 
amongst scientists, the government, and military.”127 
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Operation Gunnerside is properly viewed as a representative success in the context 
of an extended sabotage campaign targeting the German atomic program. Allied bombings 
and ground-based special operations cooperated to halt heavy water production, but special 
operations were more effective in halting the program. Over the course of a sixteen-month 
span, the Allies conducted four separate attacks against the German heavy water production 
capability: Operation Freshman, Operation Gunnerside, the American bombing raid, and 
the sabotage and sinking of a ferry transporting the last of the heavy water produced in 
Norway to Germany. The bombing raid following Operation Gunnerside prompted the 
Nazis to attempt to move the heavy water and necessary equipment to Germany.128  This 
showed the Germans were willing to continue heavy water production despite the air raid.  
However, Gunnerside and the sabotage of the ferry struck, reduced, and eventually 
destroyed the German capability directly—including the “last supplies of heavy water from 
the Vemork plant.”129 
Operation Gunnerside succeeded in part due to the agility afforded to the Company 
Linge and the SOE. While the overall sabotage effort was closely tracked by senior 
government leaders, they did not unnecessarily constrain or interfere with mission 
planning, or impose of artificial requirements. For example, senior leaders did not insist on 
a bombing raid in the wake of Operation Freshman, but provided the SOE planners with 
latitude to recommend the optimum course of action. Yet, the direct action of the raid could 
not have been accomplished without adequate coordination across the SOE and the 
combined operations of a multinational force. This highlights the cooperation and range 
necessary to effect mission accomplishment, especially when one considers Operation 
Gunnerside as a single mission within an ultimately successful campaign that progressed 
to stop the German program. Although, for example, Winston Churchill monitored Jom 
Brun’s reporting from Vemork and wanted him to come to Britain, the SOE’s Norwegian 
section led the planning for the mission while benefiting from Brun’s intelligence reports 
and detailed information about the plant’s layout.130 The combination of Tronstadt 
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technical and local expertise, adequate information sharing and coordination, subordinate 
unit empowerment, and rigorous selection and training provided the commandos of 
Operation Gunnerside and the SOE with the agility necessary to execute a successful 
counterproliferation mission. These efforts ultimately influenced the abandonment of the 
German program and supports the notion that an agile organization is suited to a 
counterproliferation role within a larger government effort.  
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III. THE ALSOS MISSION 
The fact that the German atom bomb was not an immediate threat was 
probably the most significant single piece of intelligence developed 
throughout the war. Alone, that information was enough to justify Alsos. 
 —Colonel Boris Pash, 
Alsos Mission Commander131 
 
The Alsos Mission carries considerably less notoriety than Operation Gunnerside, 
but Alsos played an important part in the Allies understanding of German capabilities and 
the shaping of the postwar nuclear capability situation. After American scientists 
successfully achieved a chain reaction using a uranium pile – a requisite stepping stone to 
the development of an atomic weapon – the atomic bomb was seen as a reachable goal.132 
As a corollary, there was a powerful assumption that the German government, who had 
leading physicists, vast resources, and a head start would already be proportionately farther 
down the path to a weapon than the Americans.133 Uranium research in Germany had begun 
two years prior to the U.S.134 
 U.S. Lieutenant General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, 
recognized the Allied invasion of Europe via Italy as an opportunity to develop intelligence 
concerning German capabilities.135 This conception developed into the Alsos (Greek for 
“grove,” resembling the Director’s name) Mission, which was a “cooperative effort by the 
Army’s G-2 (Intelligence) department, General Groves’ Manhattan District, the U.S. Navy, 
and Dr. Vannevar Bush’s Office of Scientific Research and Development.”136 Alsos’ 
mission would be to acquire nuclear-related material, research, organizational information, 
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and intelligence related to Germany’s capabilities and progress.137 General Groves reported 
to General George Marshall that Alsos “would form the nucleus for similar activity in other 
enemy and enemy-occupied countries when circumstances permit.”138 
The Alsos Mission’s role in counterproliferation shows how an agile element with 
adequate authority and coordinating capability can support strategic goals. Alsos broke the 
British monopoly on nuclear intelligence from the Allied perspective, and endeavored to 
stem the flow of vital nuclear intelligence to the Soviet Union as it ascertained where 
German progress stood. Additionally, the nature of Alsos’ composition, unique skills, and 
responsibility for providing strategic choice, as well as the disproportionate pay off the 
mission was able to achieve, justifies its consideration as a special operations mission and 
its inclusion in consideration for applicable lessons for special operations forces. The 
combined expertise of military personnel and scientists speaks to Alsos’ own special 
capabilities. 
A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
In 1939, German physical chemist Paul Harteck wrote a letter to the Reich Ministry 
of War to advise it of the potential for a weapon that would be “many orders of magnitude 
more powerful than conventional ones” and would provide “that country which makes first 
use of it an unsurpassable advantage.”139 The German atomic weapons program started 
soon after the notification. Albert Einstein’s letter warning President Franklin Roosevelt of 
prospective nuclear weapons’ capabilities five months after the German program was 
underway.140 During the war, German advances in technology seemed to indicate that they 
were capable of the intense investment and resourcing required to build an atomic bomb.141 
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To determine Germany’s nuclear capabilities and prevent proliferation of nuclear material 
and information, the U.S. established the Alsos Mission unit. Toward the end of World 
War II, the Alsos Mission successfully provided the U.S. forces with valuable intelligence, 
prevented the proliferation of nuclear material, and technical knowledge through the 
organization’s agility and composite expertise. Several factors favorably influenced Alsos’ 
organizational agility. First, Alsos had abundant resources at its disposal and authority to 
conduct their mission. Second, the Alsos Mission demonstrated a capacity to adapt based 
on lessons from previous operations. Third, unit coordinated effectively with other 
elements, services, and government agencies to achieve their objectives.  
1. Resources and Authority 
Alsos was able to maximize its agility and effects because it was afforded adequate 
resources and authority. With support from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, General 
Marshall formally established the Alsos Mission and stressed the unique allocation of 
scientists to delve into the aspects of the German weapon program: 
It is proposed to send at the proper time to allied occupied Italy a small 
group of civilian scientists assisted by the necessary military personnel to 
conduct these investigations. Scientific personnel will be selected by Brig. 
Gen. Leslie R. Groves with the approval of Dr. (Vannevar) Bush and 
military personnel will be assigned by the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, from 
personnel available to him....This group would form the nucleus for similar 
activity in other enemy and enemy-occupied countries when circumstances 
permit.142 
The initial military component for the mission was comprised of “thirteen military 
personnel, interpreters, and six scientists.”143 The mission was commanded by Lieutenant 
Colonel Boris Pash, who was complemented by Dr. Samuel Goudsmit, the chief of the 
scientific section.144 All team members were familiarized with Allied research programs 
and were capable of interrogating and collecting atomic scientific information, but were 
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compartmentalized from the Manhattan Project itself.145 For example, Dr. Goudsmit was 
a theoretical physicist who worked at the University of Michigan and had previously been 
employed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Radiation Laboratory, but he was 
not involved with the American atomic weapon program.146 According to Goudsmit, “I 
was expendable and if I fell into the hands of the Germans they could not hope to get any 
major bomb secrets out of me.”147 Lieutenant Colonel Pash had an intense reputation as an 
intelligence officer. General Groves selected him specifically because “his thorough 
competence and great drive had made a lasting impression on me.”148 The rest of the team 
also reflected the “high level of support” the unit would receive, including backing from 
the Counterintelligence Corps and a variety of U.S. Army field units on an ad hoc basis.149 
Alsos exhibited remarkable freedom to maneuver within friendly lines and gathered 
support from other Allied units to occasionally operate behind enemy positions.150  
2. Adaptation 
The Alsos Mission continued to improve their effectiveness and demonstrated 
agility by applying lessons from previous operations to current missions. There were 
essentially two phases of the Alsos Mission, with supporting operations taking place in 
each phase. Phase I occurred in the context of the invasion of the Italian peninsula and push 
toward Rome.151 The Alsos Mission’s role began in December 1943 and did not yield much 
intelligence, partially due to tenacious German defensive operations and adequate time for 
the defenders to destroy exploitable information.152 The result was a lackluster report with 
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little conclusive intelligence.153 Tellingly, the circulation of the report was markedly 
limited and “couched in guarded language.”154  
Apart from the operational difficulties, Alsos members identified a “lack of 
sufficient qualified scientists” and an “imprecise division of responsibility.”155 There were 
also apprehensions about the proficiency of some civilian scientists and their usefulness 
during interrogations.156 Generally, detainees were questioned by specially trained 
Counterintelligence Corps personnel, but incorporating civilian scientists was sometimes 
necessary.157 To clarify roles, guidelines were developed for questioning before every 
mission in order to meet mission-specific requirements.158 Alsos II, the second phase of 
the mission, followed the Allied invasion of Normandy and the advance through France 
into Germany in 1944 and 1945.159 For this phase, the staffing for the scientists was 
substantially increased, outnumbering the permanently assigned military officers by 
slightly more than four-to-one.160 This was meant to create a degree of redundancy to 
insure nuanced scientific information did not slip by undetected and also to increase the 
potential range or coverage of mission requirements.161  
3. Coordination 
The Alsos Mission’s authority assisted its coordination with other elements to 
achieve operational goals – even against the backdrop of competing demands characteristic 
of ongoing combat operations. Their coordination was undoubtedly facilitated by a letter 
from Secretary of War Stimson held by Lieutenant Colonel Pash. The letter ordered 
everyone to whom it was presented to accord the Pash “every facility and assistance” to 
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support his mission.162 Thus, Alsos was able to draw resources from surrounding forces, 
and it appears they did so cooperatively and diplomatically. There is no evidence of 
significant friction between Alsos and adjacent units – at least none that was worth 
documenting. It seems unlikely that if any friction did occur, it was not detrimental or 
lasting. Accounts of General Groves’ reservations concerning the codename of Alsos and 
the first impressions of British intelligence officers regarding an Alsos staff officer are 
reflected in the historical record, so it is unlikely that friendly unit discord had any impact 
or was noteworthy. To the contrary, the relatively small unit had essentially “unlimited 
transport resources” and applied these means audaciously.163 Within a few months of the 
invasion of Normandy and Alsos’ landing in France, their headquarters was flooded with 
documents from every scientific intelligence target available.164 Their reports from this 
period also reflect consideration of “a broad range and large quantity of disparate 
information.”165 According to author David Irving, Alsos “reigned supreme” among the 
“body-snatchers and document-sifters of the Second World War,” and comparatively, “the 
British had nothing like it.”166 The results of Alsos are a testimony to its agility in 1944 
and 1945. 
B. EFFECTS AND ANALYSIS 
Despite the lack of notoriety the Alsos Mission receives compared to Operation 
Gunnerside and other significant Allied operations, Alsos was successful in accurately 
assessing German atomic capabilities, providing material benefit to the Manhattan Project, 
and preventing the loss of valuable information and scientists to the Soviets. The collective 
Alsos operations definitively established that Germany would not be able to employ an 
atomic bomb against the Allies, they successfully prevented the capture of key German 
scientists (and in many cases coopted them), seized stores of uranium and nuclear material, 
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and acquired a myriad of research documents regarding nuclear technology.167 The 
uranium ore confiscated during an operation near Toulouse was immediately sent to the 
American facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and processed for Little Boy’s manufacture.168 
Other stores of the material were located in Germany, Belgium, and France, illustrating 
Alsos’ reach. The unit captured, questioned, and secured the cooperation of leading 
German scientists like Werner Heisenberg, Max von Laue, and Otto Hahn by tracking them 
to a remote resort in the Black Forest region.169 Over 70 target locations were visited (some 
behind enemy lines and others through securing the surrender of small towns).170 These 
locations included: 
Including sixteen universities, ten commercial organizations, ten medical 
research institutes, five veterinary institutions, four concentration camps 
where medical experiments had taken place, four miscellaneous medical 
laboratories, and two chemical weapon-related sites. Alsos Mission 
investigators prepared a total of approximately 400 scientific reports.171 
The numbers of reports and sites visited are not successes in their own right. There was no 
one document or location that served as the smoking gun for the success or failure of the 
German program. Rather, the numbers indicate the reach and study required by the team 
to aggregate the intelligence required to answer the central question that was put to them. 
Goudsmit wrote in his memoir, “It is true that no precise information was given in the 
documents, but there was far more than enough to get a view of the whole German uranium 
project. We studied the papers by candlelight… The conclusions were unmistakable.”172 
These conclusions and effect of blocking Soviet access to the sites and scientists 
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themselves was consequential toward the evolution of the close of the European Theater 
of Operations and to American weapons and space programs in the decades to follow.  
Despite scant results in its earlier phases, the Alsos Mission should be considered 
a success with strategic impacts. Over the course of two years, a relatively small unit was 
able to achieve objectives of strategic importance given adequate authority, resources, 
adaptations, and coordination – in other words, its agility. The prospect of German weapon 
development and proliferation of German advancements concerned senior decision-
makers. Coordination and command support translated to resourcing for Alsos, which was 
critical to underwriting it’s the organization’s agility, and by extension, success. Marshall 
and Stimson’s support played a significant role in gaining cooperation from adjacent units 
against the backdrop of essentially the rest of the war in Europe. With that access, Alsos 
was able to leverage the other aspects of its agility, including its unique composition of 
soldiers and scientists, to make efficient and accurate assessments suited to the 
counterproliferation mission they were assigned. The organizations adaptability was also 
vital with the stakes involved. In the wake of the scant impact of Alsos I, the unit was not 
simply torn apart with another built up to replace it with a similar mission. Instead, Alsos 
retained the instructive experience and many of the same personnel to continue to develop 
the intelligence picture they were assigned to assess. The mixture of resources, authority, 
coordination, and adaptability supported the Alsos Mission’s agility and enabled the unit 
to achieve success well beyond the program’s initial expectations, which proved to be a 
technological and strategic advantage to the United States. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In 2015, President Barack Obama stated, “No threat poses as grave a danger to our 
security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons.”173 The next year, 
President Obama modified the Unified Command Plan and transferred coordination 
authority for the Department of Defense’s counterproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction efforts to United States Special Operations Command. Counterproliferation of 
WMD is a serious, global security issue that USSOCOM has the opportunity to impact 
positively, aided by consideration of the lessons of historic special operations to and agility 
of its elements and inform units’ roles. The agility of SOF elements, constituted in 
authorities, resourcing (i.e., support), coordination, and adaptability, will positively impact 
SOF effectiveness. Organizational friction across geographic combatant commands and 
the interagency community complicates synchronization of counterproliferation 
operations. The array of adversarial networks that support nascent weapons of mass 
destruction WMD programs are difficult to unravel and suggest intensive resource 
allocation. Potentially catastrophic effects and strategic implications of nuclear 
proliferation make elimination of existing capabilities infeasible and laden with risk.  
While SOF are a versatile capability, counterproliferation requires resource 
allocation across the range of associated operations that would conceivably support 
CWMD policy. President Trump outlined his intention to “augment measures to secure, 
eliminate, and prevent the spread of WMD and related materials, their delivery systems, 
technologies, and knowledge to reduce the chance that they might fall into the hands of 
hostile actors.”174 These initiatives will require wide-ranging cooperation across joint, 
interagency, and multinational organizations – assigning them to USSOCOM, and by 
extension SOF, is not a panacea. According to Gray, “SOF provide the possibility of a 
range of precisely conducted military activities more extensive than that reliably feasible” 
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for forces trained to confront conventional threats.175 While Gray’s assertion suggests that 
SOF offers “economy of force and expansion of strategic choice,” SOF regiments are finite 
and must prioritize efforts.176 Two of USSOCOM’s SOF Truths are prescient regarding 
counterproliferation: 1) “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced” 
(USSOCOM must distribute resources and allocate assets judiciously), and 2) “Most 
Special Operations require non-SOF assistance” (USSOCOM must effectively coordinate 
with other agencies to achieve counterproliferation objectives in the name of national 
security).177 Secretary Mattis acknowledged this reality by prioritizing integration with the 
U.S. interagency community and others by stating, “Effectively expanding the competitive 
space requires combined actions […] to employ all dimensions of national power.”178 The 
disproportionate effects USSOCOM can achieve through thoughtful application of means, 
cooperation of affected Geographic Combatant Commands, and synchronization with 
wider DoD and interagency organizations have the potential to mitigate the risk associated 
with resource allocation in the expansive international “competitive space” of proliferation. 
The possibility of nuclear proliferation (in comparison to other forms of WMD) 
carries potential catastrophic consequences and strategic effects that carry high degrees of 
risk. Acknowledging the importance of counterproliferation and the challenges that WMD 
elimination would impose has led policymakers to favor “pathway defeat” actions. The 
DoD’s Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction describes pathway defeat: 
Deliberate actions taken against actors of concern and their networks to 
delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate the conceptualization, 
development, possession and proliferation of WMD and related capabilities. 
These activities focus on the specific nodes and linkages in an adversary’s 
WMD pathway. Pathway defeat measures are designed to create layers of 
complex barriers to impose recurring, collectively reinforcing, and enduring 
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costs and setbacks on those seeking to acquire or proliferate WMD or 
related capabilities.179 
The DoD’s CWMD Strategy document provides clear focus on preventative measures 
represented in this definition, but the guidance is sufficiently broad as to allow for creativity 
and disciplined initiative from planners. The coherent implementation of pathway defeat 
plans necessarily requires continued prioritization from USSOCOM leaders in balance 
with other USSOCOM requirements, and adherence to “SMART (specific, measurable, 
achievable, results-oriented, and time-limited)” criteria to enable evaluation of pathway 
defeat operations.180 Objectives like the disruption of a transregional procurement network 
or the interdiction of WMD-related material are possible examples. While the dynamics of 
counterproliferation are challenging, these dynamics allow opportunities to identify 
meaningful CWMD objectives through “flexible, innovative, and adaptive” preventive 
approaches.181 While a decision-maker may be tempted to construct an entirely new 
organization to meet an emergent threat, adaptation of existing organizations will likely 
form a stronger basis from which to pivot focus. Leveraging a suitable existing 
organization’s lessons learned enables an organization to close knowledge gaps quicker 
and avoids the illusion of progress inherent in continuous reorganization. Instead of costly 
reorganization, drawing salient lessons from the cases discussed here can offer a basis for 
useful modification. While the above cases took place during World War II, important 
lessons can still apply to pathway defeat in the context of either ostensibly peaceful or 
wartime circumstances.  
 Both case studies offer insights into how missions supporting counterproliferation 
objectives handled information sharing. While Operation Gunnerside and the Alsos 
Mission prudently compartmentalized particularly sensitive information concerning 
capabilities of friendly and enemy weapons programs, members of both units were aware 
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of the importance of their objectives and knew enough to exercise disciplined initiative. In 
the case of the Alsos Mission, the inclusion of an adequate number of scientists to 
complement military personnel enabled the unit’s effectiveness. The complementary 
knowledge the scientists and military personnel brought together proved valuable and when 
accompanied by an operationally appropriate awareness of the Manhattan Project. It would 
be imprudent and impractical to brief every SOF soldier about every detail of 
counterproliferation efforts worldwide. However, mission-related understanding 
concerning counterproliferation goals, strategies, and an appreciation for 
counterproliferation’s importance is not reckless and can involve greater portions of SOF.  
Widespread unfamiliarity of counterproliferation goals – and over-compartmentalization – 
neglects an opportunity to involve a force with a worldwide presence that could offer 
considerable potential for friendly understanding and initiatives reflecting the proactive 
intent of pathway defeat. Such involvement could provide missing pieces needed to assess 
various networks (procurement, financial, etc.) involved in proliferation. Clarifying the 
vagueness surrounding counterproliferation would counteract Adams’ description of 
counterproliferation as ambiguous and would allow for an enhanced sensitivity for 
proliferation issues and facilitate opportunities for cooperation across organizations.182 
Both cases highlight that understanding the threat and attacking proliferation 
networks can be enhanced with coordination across SOF organizations internally and 
through partnerships fostered by engagement of United States SOF abroad. This conclusion 
holds potential for translation from the setting of the case studies to pathway defeat by 
leveraging broadened understanding of counterproliferation and partnerships established 
by SOF with other nations via security cooperation, as Carlson suggests.183 Tracking and 
disrupting proliferation networks can conceivably be more feasible when there is already 
a presence in an unnamed country manifested by ongoing SOF-led partnerships. This 
presence provides a beneficial relationships and working knowledge of the given nation’s 
security apparatus. SOF offer additional perspective to these aspects distinct from U.S. 
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intelligence services through security cooperation working relationships. These 
relationships can be used to clarify or assist in a way far less dramatic than a midnight raid 
on heavy water plant but that reflects on-the-ground familiarity that enabled Operation 
Gunnerside’s success. Operation Gunnerside stands as an example of the expansion of 
strategic options that SOF offer decision makers. This expansion of options is cogent when 
considering counterproliferation courses of action, even with the inherent risk of the 
mission compared to the arguably less risky – though arguably less effective – bombing 
that was the Allied default. This is not to suggest that every option must involve 
commandos, but is a reminder that calculated risks may be appropriate in pursuit of the 
most effective action with respect to counterproliferation. Courses of actions grounded in 
credible intelligence and viability are more appropriate than half-measures.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Increased familiarity with counterproliferation, consistent communication with 
weapons specialists, and coordination through security cooperation are present in the case 
studies and can be applied to contemporary pathway defeat. The lessons learned in the 
crucible of war can be carried over to the competitive environment of today’s relative peace 
and applied to techniques for pathway defeat. Additionally, they are important 
considerations for the potential for a WMD program elimination mission in the future 
against an emerging nuclear nation in the process of developing a nuclear arms program. 
In order to stifle the potential propagation of nuclear material, expertise, and technology 
associated with such a scenario, a considerably large effort will likely need to be made. 
The scale of such an operation would possibly exceed the grasp of a tightly 
compartmentalized, counterproliferation-centric organization devoted to that sole mission. 
Agility from SOF would be necessary to manage the consequences of an effort to eliminate 
a national program that will probably involve more than a single research site, weapon 
location, or series of air strikes. An organization that is familiar with counterproliferation 
would be suited for that high-stakes role. 
USSOCOM’s recent assumption of coordinating authority responsibilities for 
counterproliferation represents an opportunity to innovate the DoD’s approach to a 
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strategically important security issue. In an environment characterized by “reemergence of 
long-term strategic competition” and rogue regimes endeavoring to wield disproportionate 
influence, re-assessments are critical to planning and employment of efficient and effective 
strategy in service of U.S. policies. An emphasis on re-assessment also underlines the need 
for rapid adaptation as commanders and staffs align outputs and outcomes to inform 
assessments and adjustments to strategy. This adaptation should include a broader 
understanding of counterproliferation goals and requirements amongst special operations 
units that may be able to contribute to the aggregate intelligence picture required to 
understand the myriad procurement networks involved in proliferation. In the 2018 
National Defense Strategy, Secretary Mattis concluded by calling on the DoD to “transition 
to a culture of performance where results and accountability matter” to aid responsiveness 
and in seizing upon short-lived opportunities.184 As USSOCOM continues to build upon 
its coordination capabilities and counterproliferation efforts, it should take care to align its 
performance measures with critical counterproliferation objectives. 
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Examination of historical case studies to inform discourse regarding the application 
of SOF in functional, transregional problems like CWMD is not limited to these cases. 
Researchers can potentially glean historical lessons for pathway defeat from cases which 
involve networks that proliferate illicit substances, profit in stolen artifacts, or engage in 
human tracking – among others. For example, an examination of the SOE mission 
Operation Bonzos, led by Austrian resistance fighter Albrecht Gaiswinkler, could show 
how the Allies leveraged a combination of SOF competencies to track and recover cached 
valuable art (including the Mona Lisa) amassed by Nazis during World War II.185 Like 
Operation Gunnerside and the Alsos Mission, there is potential to study agility’s role in an 
organization’s success and to inform the viability of SOF’s role in pathway defeat or other 
potential functional problems though historical examination.  
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